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Abstract 
To meet current market requirements and improve their competitive position, companies cooperate with their 
partners in value-adding networks. To exploit potential performance improvements, it is essential for 
companies to increasingly share Production Planning and Control-related data. Financial and non-financial 
incentives are beneficial to foster the inter-company exchange of such data. This paper proposes an approach 
for designing an application-specific incentive system framework, forcing information sharing in value-
adding networks. The framework is based on a requirements analysis towards both value-adding networks 
and Production Planning and Control. The outcome of the approach is the possibility of deriving concrete 
incentive systems. The approach developed was applied and verified in a use case. 
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1. Introduction 
The tightening of global competition, e. g. through new entrants disrupting entire industries with innovative 
business models, and the customer`s requirement for individualised products being delivered within short 
times are only some of the market trends manufacturing companies are facing in the 21st century [1, 2]. 
Focussing on core competencies and collaborating in inter-firm value-adding networks is a key enabler for 
enhancing performance and, hence, staying competitive within this volatile economy [3-5]. The evidence 
that supports pursuing inter-company functionalities may even be indispensable in the future to allow 
companies to remain partners in an existing value-adding network [6]. 
To meet the customer`s requirements, special significance needs to be assigned to the sharing of information 
related to Production Planning and Control (PPC). Information sharing can be seen as the heart of inter-
company collaboration, and thus forms the basis for efficiency improvements in Supply Chain Management 
(SCM) [7]. A potential barrier to information sharing across companies is a lack of incentives caused by 
imbalances in benefiting [8]. Therefore, finding suitable incentives for partners, e. g. through gain sharing 
mechanisms, may be a solution to foster the sharing of data [9, 10]. This publication provides a conceptual 
model that supports designing a suitable incentive system for information sharing and herewith facilitates 
practical implementation. In order to validate its functionality, the approach was applied and verified in a 




2. Information sharing in value-adding networks 
The concept of cooperating with legally independent partners in supply chains and value-adding networks 
respectively in order to achieve both individual and common goals is crucial for remaining competitive in 
customer-centric business ecosystems that include both suppliers and customers (see Figure 1) [11, 12]. 
Porter [13] established the concept of reducing operational inefficiencies during the value creation of a 
product, however, the goal of improving cross-company production processes has evolved significantly since 
Croom et al. [14]. Companies tend to focus on their core competencies in order to reduce their real net output 
ratios and offer specialised products and services in value-adding networks. Competition shifts from a firm 
to a network level [15]. Within supply chain management, emphasis is placed especially on the value added 
in every step, in contrast to the cost incurred [16, 17]. Collaborative-based SCM initiatives mainly include 
the sharing of information about demand and operations, joint planning and joint decision making, incentive 
alignment, resource sharing, collaborative communication and joint knowledge creation [18]. Examples of 
this are Vendor-Managed Inventory, Efficient Consumer Response and Collaborative Planning, Forecasting 
and Replenishment. Collaborative planning, knowledge transfer and replenishment activities between the 
entities enable operational efficiency improvements of the value-adding network performance, which can 
lead to financial and operational benefits for every firm in the network. Financial benefits include reduced 
costs or increased sales, while operational benefits are less tangible, such as higher customer satisfaction, 
greater flexibility in the value-adding processes, increased product availability, reduced batch sizes, lower 
lead and replenishment times or shorter reaction times to changed demand [11, 19]. 
Due to its importance for inter-company collaboration, a definition of information sharing is given that is 
highly appropriate for this publication: 
“Information sharing refers to the extent to which a firm shares a variety of relevant, accurate, complete, 
and confidential information in a timely manner with its supply chain partners” [18, p.166]. 
In greater detail, downstream information sharing by a target company means vertical sharing of information 
with the organisation that is located at a later stage in the value-creating process, e. g. a retailer is located 
downstream of a manufacturer. Accordingly, upstream information sharing by the target company refers to 
vertical information sharing to an organisation that is producing a good prior to the value-creation process 
at the target company, e. g. the target company shares information with its supplier. Finally, horizontal 
information sharing refers to the sharing or receiving of information from an organisation that operates at 
the same stage of the production process, e. g. competitors. See Figure 2 for a detailed overview of the 










Figure 1: (a) Supply chain; 
(b) Value-adding network [20] 
 Figure 2: Typology of information sharing types 































3. State of research into incentive systems fostering information sharing 
Researchers have already been investigating the effects of incentive systems for information sharing in 
value-adding networks and revenue models. Based on the relevant work presented, the research motivation 
for this work is derived below.  
As information sharing improves the performance of a value-adding network under certain conditions [10], 
incentives are needed for stable cooperation in terms of solving the issue of a fair distribution of gains [22], 
i. e. appropriate rewards. The prerequisite for being able to align incentives among partners is assessing the 
gains that are to be shared [18], as well as revenue models in terms of “incentive schemes such as pay-for-
performance and pay-for-effort” [23, p. 264]. 
Feldmann and Müller [24] suggested an incentive scheme for companies to share true information within 
value-adding networks as they identified actively falsified information as a major deficit of information-
sharing concepts. Their incentive scheme is based on financial rewards for sharing true information, and 
penalties for sharing falsified or manipulated information. No incentive schemes are presented that 
incentivise value-adding network partners to intensify information sharing in the first place.  
Wang et al. [25] created an incentive model for information sharing in the context of value-adding networks 
to enhance coordination among partners and improve the overall network performance. To estimate the 
impact of information-sharing initiatives in value-adding networks, they introduced an index that is based 
on the four incentive mechanisms “value-adding network contracts”, “team trust”, “joint decision making” 
and “information technology coalition”, all of which can be calculated by simulating values for diverse 
indicators of each. However, concrete recommendations are missing that would indicate which form of the 
four incentive mechanisms should be specifically applied in a concrete setting, e. g. which value-adding 
network contract would be most suitable for which kind of information-sharing structure.  
Simatupang and Sridharan [23] introduced the integrative framework for value-adding network collaboration 
suggesting taking into account the following five core dimensions to plan and operate inter-company 
collaboration initiatives: “collaborative performance system”, “decision synchronisation”, “integrated value-
adding network processes”, “incentive alignment” and “information sharing”. Their framework allows 
collaborative initiatives to be evaluated towards a company’s effectiveness in improving its SC performance, 
as well as actions to be defined on how to design, implement and run value-adding network collaboration. 
Gassmann et al. [26] provide an overview of 55 business model types, including the underlying revenue 
model, which can in part be used to design incentive schemes for value-adding networks. Amongst others, 
they introduce the business model types “add-on”, “crowdfunding”, “freemium” or “pay-per-use”. 
Even though scientific studies exist that deal with how to distribute earnings among the value-adding 
network partners through gain-sharing mechanisms [27], an approach to design a specific incentive system 
has not been modelled yet. In fact, this work follows up on a publication by Zipfel et al. [20], who suggested 
developing an incentive system for fostering information sharing.  
To the best of our knowledge, no prior research has been found that formulates a model especially suited to 
incentivise value-adding network partners via concrete, individual financial or non-financial rewards to 
boost information sharing.  
4. Approach for an incentive system for information sharing in value-adding networks 
The application-specific incentive system framework developed for information sharing in value-adding 
networks consists of five steps (see Figure 3). The first four steps lay out the requirements for PPC-related 
information sharing, whereas in step five, the incentive schemes are derived from the requirements. The five 





Figure 3: Incentive system framework for information sharing 
4.1 Defining the performance target system 
To set the goal of each information-sharing initiative, in a first step, the application-specific performance 
target system needs to be defined. Originating from Wiendahl’s PPC target system [28] that includes the two 
dimensions logistics performance and logistics cost, the value-adding network performance target system is 
divided into the two dimensions of financial and non-financial targets [29]. The financial targets are further 
divided into sales increase and cost decrease, whereas the non-financial targets are operational improvements 
or of intangible impact. As operational improvements, smaller batch sizes, shorter lead times or a higher 
adherence to delivery times may be mentioned, for example. Performance targets with rather intangible 
impact include, for instance, greater customer satisfaction. 
4.2 Describing the value-adding network characteristics 
The framework is based on a value-adding network with multiple entities, including suppliers, manufacturers 
and retailers, to serve the final customers’ needs. To set up an application-specific incentive system, the 
number of partners participating in the sharing agreement and the direction of the information flows is highly 
relevant. For instance, if safety stocks cause high inventory costs at multiple retailers of one manufacturer, 
the incentive system to be set up should consider all relevant partners. Furthermore, existing data flows 
between value-adding partners and ERP/PPC systems have a direct influence on the design and 
implementation of incentive systems, as existing data streams facilitate enhanced information exchange. 
This characteristic becomes especially important if implementation effort is compared with the expected 
outcome of setting up an incentive system for information sharing.  
4.3 Identifying the PPC information needed 
The next step requires the potential of different types of information to be isolated in order to attain the 
desired performance improvement targets. This building block is, hence, based on two factors: the type of 
information shared and the direction of information sharing. Information types derived from prior research 
can be categorised as demand (e. g. order size, due date or deviations), forecast (e. g. planning of machine 
capacities and batch sizes) and event (e. g. machine breakdowns or rush orders). The direction of information 
sharing is divided into upstream, downstream and horizontal information sharing (see Chapter 2). See 











































Table 1: Effects of information sharing on the performance targets 
Performance 
target  
Improving information-sharing mechanism References 
Sales increase - Upstream demand for information sharing (UDIS) weakens double 
marginalisation and avoids missed stock-outs 
- Downstream forecast of information sharing leads to better retail prices  
[9, 30-32] 
Costs decrease - UDIS weakens bullwhip effect, thus enabling inventory cost savings, reduces 
overproduction and leads to unit production cost savings 
- Downstream information sharing (DIS) of shipping data reduces safety stocks 




- UDIS sharing can lead to shorter lead times and smaller batch sizes  
- DIS of shipping data can lead to a higher level of timeliness 
[19, 34, 37] 
Intangible 
impact 
- UDIS can incentivise the manufacturer not to establish a direct selling 
channel and lead to higher customer satisfaction due to fewer stock-outs 
- Upstream and horizontal sharing of forecast information can lead to a higher 
capacity of production 
[11, 32, 39, 40] 
4.4 Assessing further company-specific requirements 
The fourth step for designing incentive systems covers the identification and assessment of company-specific 
requirements. This building block allows to identify specific conditions in a standardised, structured and 
comparable manner. The requirements are derived from four dimensions, namely network-, information-, 
operations- and business model-related requirements. Each dimension covers multiple indicators that take 
into account the specific needs of an enterprise towards an incentive system for information sharing. In order 
to classify the company-specific requirements, a five-level scoring system was developed. Table 2 
exemplarily introduces the scoring system for the network-related requirement “degree of flexibility”. 
Table 2: Scoring system for the indicator “degree of flexibility” 
Dimension Indicator 
Score 

























very likely  
 
4.5 Selecting the incentive scheme 
After having set all relevant prerequisites (see Chapters 4.1 - 4.4), the fifth step is to select an adequate 
incentive scheme for each value-adding partner. Based on a literature review, ten incentive schemes have 
been identified as particularly suitable for the purpose of information sharing [10, 19, 26, 29, 41-44]: 
 Add-on: A value-adding network firm offers its partner basic information for a specific price with 
an add-on option for further information at an additional cost.  
 Barter: Partners in the value-adding network exchange and trade equivalent information among 
themselves. 
 Cost sharing: Two forms of cost sharing might be applicable to information exchange: On the one 
hand, the cost of gathering the additional data is shared among the partners and on the other hand, 
the reduced cost and the resulting benefits incurred through information exchange might be shared. 
 Freemium: A firm shares basic data for free with its partner, however, a premium option is available 




 Open data model: Firms collaborate by sharing information with each other for free to use and 
analyse, which leverages the whole network’s competitive position against other networks. 
 Pay-per-use: A firm offers its partner information under the payment mechanism pay-per-use when 
needed, which means costs accrue only after relevant data has been exchanged and used. 
 Pay-with-data: A physical or intangible product or service offered by one partner is paid for by the 
other partner providing certain information instead of money. 
 Revenue sharing: The additional revenue realised through information sharing is shared according 
to a specific percentage among the partners contributing to achieving such revenue. 
 Subscription: The firm sharing information offers its partners the opportunity to subscribe to 
information flows, hence, to get access to relevant data by paying a weekly, monthly or yearly fee. 
 Trade credit: By sharing information with upstream network partners, companies may be granted 
approval for a longer payment period and, hence, a so-called trade credit. 
To select the best-fitting incentive scheme in accordance to a certain use case, two process steps are required. 
Firstly, the general applicability of the incentive schemes has to be analysed at a high level (see Chapters 
4.1 - 4.3). For this purpose, all incentive schemes were evaluated with regard to the type and direction of 
information needed and the number of partners involved in the network setting. Table 3 gives an exemplary 
overview of the evaluation results for the incentive scheme pay-per-use. By comparing the evaluation results 
with the scenario conditions given, a pre-selection of potential incentive schemes can be made. 
Table 3: Evaluation results for the incentive scheme pay-per-use 
Incentive 
scheme 
Type of information shared Direction of information sharing # partners involved
Demand Forecast Event Diverse Downstream Upstream Horizontal Single Multiple
Pay-per-use - - x - x x - x - 
 
Secondly, the characteristics of the remaining incentive schemes need to be contrasted with the company-
specific requirements identified (see Chapter 4.4). By analysing the incentive schemes’ capabilities, amongst 
others by conducting a pairwise comparison, the incentive schemes that are best suited to meet the 
requirements resulting from the indicators could be derived. The analysis results are shown in Table 4. 
Table 4: Overview of preferred incentive schemes for company-specific requirements 




Degree of flexibility Add-on, freemium, open data model, pay-per-use 
Dependency on trustworthiness Add-on, subscription, pay-with-data, pay-per-use, barter 




Acceptable uncertainty about the 
outcome 
Revenue or cost sharing, pay-per-use, open data model 
Importance of the value of  
information shared 





Ease of implementation Trade credit, open data model, freemium 





Degree of monetary incentives Add-on, revenue or cost sharing, subscription, pay-per-use
Level of integration into the 
company’s own business model 





5. Use case 
For evaluation purposes, the developed framework was applied in a specific use case. The use case deals 
with series production of an e-scooter manufacturer M, who produces a maximum daily output of 50 (see 
Figure 4). This size differs from the batch size of the wheel supplier S2, which produces in batches of 400 
due to the economic use of its production machinery. This is because the order release is based on actual 
consumption by end customers, i.e. orders are placed when a current stock of final products falls below a 
certain limit. In this case, the next batch of 400 wheels is produced and shipped resulting in stocks becoming 
available at the manufacturer’s plant. Furthermore, so that the buyers’ needs can be serviced in a timely 
manner, high safety stocks of wheels are maintained along the value chain. The unfavourable high stocks 
therefore result not only in high processing times, but also in extra administration and capital commitment 
cost. Hence, the hypothesis formulated is that an increase in information sharing between the retailers, 
manufacturer and suppliers can facilitate planning and reduce stocks. The incentive system shall be 
implemented with R2 first and rolled out later to other critical steps in the production process. According to 
M, the outcome should be focussed on financial benefits, which means that decent effort in setting up the 
collaborative system is acceptable if the likelihood of financial success is high. 
 
Figure 4: Exemplary e-scooter value-adding network structure 
To find the most suitable incentive system that allows M to reduce its stocks, the approach developed was 
applied. Once the inventory cost to be reduced had been defined as the performance target and the value-
adding network characteristics had been analysed, the upstream demand information from R2 could be 
identified as the PPC information needed to be able to reduce inefficient high safety stocks. Hence, the 
incentive schemes trade credit, open data model and pay-per-use could be excluded from the final incentive 
scheme list, due to the information type and direction of information sharing. As a fourth step, the company-
specific requirements were assessed and scored as either low, intermediate or high. For example, as the 
degree of flexibility with regard to future internal or external changes is not of upmost importance for 
company M, this indicator was rated low. However, as M strives for short-term financial benefits, the degree 
of monetary incentives could be rated high. Once all indicators had been assessed and rated for this particular 
use case, the requirements implicitly imposed could be compared with the capabilities of the incentive 
mechanisms in the following fifth step to identify the one that fits best. As an outcome of the analysis the 
incentive scheme revenue sharing was proposed as the most suitable for incentivising R2 to share upstream 
demand information so that M could lower inventory levels, reduce searching and administration times and 
finally achieve a higher output. Therefore, as decreasing costs was one of the goals formulated by M, it is 




6. Conclusion and outlook 
Sharing of PPC-relevant information among partners in value-adding networks is a key factor in remaining 
competitive in the 21st century, since specific PPC information can have a positive effect on the performance 
of the whole value chain. Incentive systems make it possible to influence the behaviour of third parties, and 
thus foster inter-organisational information exchange. However, to date, too little conceptual research has 
been conducted on incentive frameworks for information sharing in value-adding networks. This study 
provides an approach for designing application-specific incentive systems fostering the exchange of 
PPC-relevant information among partners: Firstly, the performance targets of the improvement initiative 
and, secondly, network characteristics need to be defined. Once the basis is set, the relevant PPC information 
required needs to be identified in a third step. Once further company-specific requirements have been 
assessed, the incentive scheme most suitable to the use case can be selected. 
In order to improve the applicability of the approach presented, expert interviews and further use cases will 
be conducted in the near future. These will, in particular, enable more customised recommendations for 
action to be included, such as adding industry-specific assessment criteria or further innovative incentive 
schemes. Moreover, it would be interesting to broaden the scope of the framework towards more complex 
settings, such as conflicting interests of partners that are part of various value-adding networks. Finally, it 
would be highly beneficial to include a mechanism for assessing the monetary value of information shared 
among the network partners, in order to be able to estimate the amount of the different rewards.  
 
Acknowledgements 
The Mittelstand 4.0-Kompetenzzentrum Augsburg research and development project is funded by the 




[1] Reinhart 2017: Handbuch Industrie 4.0. Geschäftsmodelle, Prozesse, Technik. München: Hanser. 
[2] Friedli, Lanza, Schuh, Treber, Wiech, Gützlaff 2017: Aktive Gestaltung globaler Produktionsnetzwerke. In: 
Zeitschrift für wirtschaftlichen Fabrikbetrieb, 05, p. 279-283. 
[3] Treber, Lanza 2018: Transparency in Global Production Networks. Improving Disruption Management by 
Increased Information Exchange. In: Procedia CIRP, 72, p. 898-903. 
[4] McKinsey&Company 2019: Globalization in Transition. The Future of Trade and Value Chains. Retrieved from 
https://www.mckinsey.com/featured-insights/innovation-and-growth/globalization-in-transition-the-future-of-
trade- and-value-chains, 05/15/2019. 
[5] Hill, Zhang, Miller 2018: Collaborative planning, forecasting, and replenishment & firm performance. An 
empirical evaluation. In: International Journal of Production Economics, 196, p. 12-23. 
[6] Schuh, Stich 2012: Produktionsplanung und -steuerung 1. Grundlagen der PPS. Berlin: Springer. 
[7] Bowersox, Closs 1996: Logistical management. The integrated supply chain process. In: McGraw-Hill series in 
marketing. New York: McGraw-Hill. 
[8] Keifer 2010: Beyond point of sale data: Looking forward, not backwards for demand forecasting. Retrieved from 
http://www.gxsedi.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/wp_beyond_point_of_sale_data.pdf, 04/27/2019. 
[9] Guo 2009: The benefits of downstream information acquisition. In: Marketing Science, 28(3), p. 457-471. 
[10] Teunter, Babai, Bokhorst, Syntetos 2018: Revisiting the value of information sharing in two-stage supply chains. 




[11] Seifert 2003: Collaborative planning, forecasting, and replenishment. How to create a supply chain advantage. 
New York: AMACOM. 
[12] Simatupang, Sridharan 2002: The collaborative supply chain. In: The International Journal of Logistics 
Management, 13(1), p. 15-30. 
[13] Porter 1985: Competitive Advantage. Creating and Sustaining Superior Performance. New York: Free Press. 
[14] Croom, Romano, Giannakis 2000: Supply chain management. An analytical framework for critical literature 
review. In: European journal of purchasing & supply management, 6(1), p. 67-83.  
[15] Kothandaraman, Wilson 2001: The future of competition: value-creating networks. In: Industrial marketing 
management, 30(4), p. 379-389.  
[16] Stabell, Fjeldstad 1998: Configuring value for competitive advantage: on chains, shops and networks. In: Strategic 
management journal, 19(5), p. 413-437. 
[17] Kähkönen, Lintukangas 2018: Key dimensions of value creation ability of supply management. In: International 
Journal of Operations & Production Management, 38(4), p. 979-996. 
[18] Cao, Zhang 2011: Supply chain collaboration. Impact on collaborative advantage and firm performance. In: 
Journal of Operations Management, 29(3), p. 163-180. 
[19] Cachon, Fisher 2000: Supply chain inventory management and the value of shared information. In: Management 
Science, 46(8), p. 1032-1048. 
[20] Zipfel, Braunreuther, Reinhart 2019: Approach for a Production Planning and Control System in Value-Adding 
Networks. In: Procedia CIRP, 81, p. 1195-1200. 
[21] Barratt 2004: Understanding the meaning of collaboration in the supply chain. In: Supply Chain Management: an 
international journal, 9(1), p. 30-42. 
[22] Verdonck, Beullens, Caris, Ramaekers, Janssens 2016: Analysis of collaborative savings and cost allocation 
techniques for the cooperative carrier facility location problem. In: Journal of the Operational Research Society 
67(6), p. 853-871. 
[23] Simatupang, Sridharan 2005: An integrative framework for supply chain collaboration. In: The International 
Journal of Logistics Management, 16(2), p. 257-274. 
[24] Feldmann, Müller 2003: An incentive scheme for true information providing in Supply Chains. In: Omega, 31(2), 
p. 63-73. 
[25] Wang, Yan, Wei 2014: A Holistic Incentive Model of Information Sharing in Supply Chain. In: Applied 
Mechanics and Materials, 457-458, p. 1403-1406. 
[26] Gassmann, Frankenberger, Csik 2014: The Business Model Navigator. 55 Models That Will Revolutionise Your 
Business. London: Pearson. 
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